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1. Introduction: Giving Hume’s Dialogues their due
Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion are often taken to be a re-
flection on philosophical knowledge of God. But what can we make of what
is, supposedly, a detailed, carefully crafted critique of natural theology,
from someone famous for his general critique of knowledge in general? The
Dialogues’ Philo, a skeptical character sometimes voicing Humean views,
describes philosophy as the rationalization of practical necessity, never
reaching beyond experience, whose exactitude leads to «greater stability, if
not greater truth»1. Reason might not achieve knowledge, but it can be di-
rected toward a functional end. Whether or not Hume would embrace as a
compliment Anscombe’s famous charge that he was «a mere – brilliant –
sophist»2, it seems reasonable to assume that Hume intended this work not
primarily to display abstract argument (even negatively), but to achieve
some pedagogical purpose.
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1 D. HUME, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part I, paragraph 8 [hereafter cit-
ed I.8, with quotations and paragraph numberings according to the edition D. COLEMAN
(ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007]. Cf. the remarks of Cleanthes at I.15,
suggesting that skeptics are not philosophers. 
2 G.E.M ANSCOMBE, Modern Moral Philosophy, “Philosophy” XXXIII, 124, (1958), 3.
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A reading of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion thus needs
to be open to the possibility – and, as I will argue, a close reading requires
us to notice – that the work is not designed primarily to address knowledge
of God, but something else more practical, an attitude or disposition apart
from knowledge. Especially given Hume’s particular care in crafting the
Dialogues, we can only do justice to the work if we pay close attention to
the demands it places on the reader.
The first part of the paper will highlight some of the hermeneutic chal-
lenges of the Dialogues. Rather than review competing scholarly interpre-
tations, I will offer an idealized, simplified progression of interpretations,
such as would, I think, occur naturally to readers who come to Hume with-
out any specific scholarly background. Each interpretation is inviting and
initially plausible but, upon closer inspection, inherently unstable. (For
readers not familiar with the text, reviewing a series of tempting but unsus-
tainable interpretations also serves to summarize the Dialogues and some
of its key moves and peculiarities; for readers more familiar with the Dia-
logues and scholarly debates about them, this procedure indirectly serves
to make sense of some of the known hermeneutic challenges and address
some of the controversies of the text.)
After considering three progressively more sophisticated but still unsta-
ble interpretations, we will see that the last and most stable of these inter-
pretations invites a comparison with St. Thomas’s Summa Theologiae, al-
though perhaps not in ways that would initially be expected. The second
part of the paper will explore this comparison and the fourth (and most sta-
ble) interpretation it suggests, in order better to characterize the strengths
and weaknesses of the Dialogues and foster a greater appreciation of what
it tries to accomplish in and for the reader, whether it succeeds, and why
or why not.
2. Three Unstable Interpretations of the Dialogues
New readers of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion often find
it disorienting. Even bringing along some general knowledge of Hume and
of the history of philosophy, it is challenging to discern the purpose and
achievement of the text. A coherent interpretation is difficult to pin down:
the Dialogues seem designed to invite one interpretation, only to challenge
that interpretation on closer inspection. Thus a reader might be drawn to
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three natural interpretations which I will describe in a logical progression,
although a given reader of the Dialogues might experience these interpre-
tations competing with each other simultaneously.
2.1 The First Interpretation
In the first, let us call naïve, reading, the text is what it appears to be: a
philosophical dialogue about rational basis for belief in God. There are
three main characters, representing three different positions, and Hume
puts them in conversation with each other to test their views; by the end,
there is an apparent victor, who presumably represents Hume’s view.
The surface structure of the text and key parts of dialogue strongly invite
this interpretation. After a framing conversation between two (otherwise ap-
parently extraneous) characters about the appropriate uses of the dialogue
form, three main characters are introduced and they spend the rest of the
dialogue arguing about how and what we can know about God. Part I begins
with the characters laying out their general perspectives. Demea, who had
been introduced as representing “rigid and inflexible orthodoxy”, describes
the role of philosophy in theological education, to emphasize intellectual
humility. Philo, who had been introduced as representing “careless skepti-
cism”, appears to agree, only wanting to emphasize even more than Demea
the limits of reason. This prompts Cleanthes, who had been introduced as
having an “accurate philosophical turn”, to defend the power of reason,
leading to a general discussion of skepticism, and then, in Part II, Clean-
thes offers a “design” argument as an a posteriori argument that establish-
es knowledge of the existence and nature of God.
The bulk of the Dialogues consists in the two other characters criticiz-
ing this argument, through Part VIII. Then, in Part IX, Demea, offers an a
priori argument for the existence of God, which is criticized more quickly
by both Cleanthes and Philo. Parts X and XI take up the problem of evil,
and then in Part XII there appears to be a friendly resolution between Phi-
lo and Cleanthes. The opening frame is closed with a verdict that Clean-
thes is the victor.
Taken at face value, then, it appears that the dialogue allows for a very
limited natural theology, in which some inference to the existence of God is
warranted, so long as it is duly chastened by skepticism to withhold strong
claims about the nature of God.
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2.2 The instability of the first interpretation
It does not take much to discern that this interpretation is unstable. It may
appear unstable even before getting to Part I, for the prefatory framing con-
versation plants doubts about the reliability of the characterizations of Phi-
lo, Cleanthes, and Demea. The character giving those characterizations is
Pamphilus, about whom we know very little except that he is a pupil of, and
like an “adopted son” to, Cleanthes, since Cleanthes was an “intimate
friend” of Pamphilus’ father. Why would Hume invent those details except
to undermine the objectivity of Pamphilus as the umpire for the entire con-
versation?
Pamphilus is not a main figure in the dialogues themselves, but we are
trusting him as narrator retelling the conversation, and he serves as a fram-
ing character not only at the beginning, where the characterizations (“rigid
and inflexible orthodoxy”, “careless skepticism”, “accurate philosophical
turn”) are his; he also renders the final judgment. His natural sympathy
for Cleanthes should weaken his claim that Cleanthes is the victor, but so
does the way he phrases that claim: “upon serious review of the whole, I
cannot but think, that Philo’s principles are more probable than Demea’s;
but that those of Cleanthes approach still nearer the truth”. Without real-
izing it, with this evaluation Pamphilus has rejected the confident terms of
Cleanthes and adopted the skepticism of Philo: one thinker’s views are
“more probable” than the other, and the winner hasn’t demonstrated a con-
clusion, but has only “approached still nearer the truth”. Philo (or Hume)
could not have asked for a more fitting embodiment of the rules of skepti-
cal evaluation.
Other doubts are planted early on about how seriously to take the theo-
logical arguments of the dialogues. In the prefatory epistle, Pamphilus ac-
knowledges the awkwardness and limits of the dialogue form, but says that
it is appropriate for matters that are obvious but important (to give new life
to things that we may take for granted), as well as for matters that are ob-
scure and uncertain (since no definitive treatment can be given). These sets
of qualities seem in tension. Which is relevant to “natural religion”? Both:
according to Pamphilus, the being of God is obvious and important, but the
nature of God is obscure and uncertain. Even here, Pamphilus is taking a
position closer to Philo’s than to Cleanthes’ – the latter, for much of the di-
alogue, defends an argument meant to reveal something of God’s nature; the
former is willing to acknowledge that God’s existence is “obvious” so long
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as it is construed as an inescapable opinion, and not the conclusion of the-
oretical reasoning.
This brings us to the slipperiness of Philo, however – another feature of
the Dialogues that makes a stable interpretation difficult. Throughout the
work, Philo seems to play the other characters off each other, strategically
aligning with one in order to criticize another, but then changing alliances.
In Part I, Philo objects to Demea teaching theology so late in a child’s ed-
ucation, and gets Cleanthes to argue about the philosophical significance of
skepticism. In Part II, Philo allies with Demea to provoke Cleanthes to ar-
gue for God’s nature; for much of what follows, this sets Demea against
Cleanthes, until, in Part IX, Demea attempts to defend an a priori argument,
which Philo attacks with Cleanthes. By Part XI, Demea is frustrated by the
changing alliances, and Cleanthes too feels played (11.14 -15); Demea,
feeling more betrayed, extracts himself, while Cleanthes, who has all along
been more friendly with and understanding of Philo, had an inkling about
the sceptic’s strategy, making him susceptible to a strategic reconciliation
with Philo in Part XII. Even in this reconciliation, Philo is slippery. He acts
most pious and concerned to promote religion, and appears to accept a lim-
ited version of the design argument3 – but it is only as a belief, impressing
itself with necessity on the mind, not as an argument that conforms to the
canons of sound reasoning4.
This conviction about the nature of belief in God leads to something even
more surprising, the claim from Philo that the dispute between theism and
atheism is only a semantic disagreement: atheists and theists really believe
the same thing, but their different dispositions lead them to give it different
names5! This position, voiced by Philo in attempt to find common ground
with Cleanthes, is reinforced in the strongest way possible, with one of
Hume’s few footnotes:
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universe, at II.3, his so-called “reversal” in Part XII is not so dramatic as some commen-
tators treat it.
4 Alfred Freddoso describes Philo as vacillating between optimistic pragmatism and
pessimistic Nietscheanism; A.J. FREDDOSO, Fides et Ratio: A ‘Radical’ Vision of Intellectu-
al Inquiry, in A. RAMOS – M.I. GEORGE (eds.), Faith, Scholarship and Culture in the 21st
Century, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, DC 2002, 28.
5 Here too, we should not be surprised that this is offered as conciliatory to Cleanthes,
given that Cleanthes had previously equated mysticism with atheism, at IV.3.
UUJ_3_2020_layout  05/02/21  09:52  Pagina 77
It seems evident that the dispute between the skeptics and dogmatists
is entirely verbal, or, at least, regards only degrees of doubt and assur-
ance which we ought to indulge with regard to all reasoning: and such
disputes are commonly, at the bottom, verbal and admit not of any pre-
cise determination. No philosophical dogmatist denies that there are
difficulties both with regard to the senses and to all science, and that
these difficulties are, in a regular, logical method, absolutely insolv-
able. No skeptic denies that we lie under an absolute necessity, not
withstanding these difficulties, of thinking, and believing, and reason-
ing, with regard to all kinds of subjects, and even of frequently assent-
ing with confidence and security. The only difference, then, between
these sects, if they merit that name, is that the skeptic, from habit,
caprice, or inclination, insists most on the difficulties; the dogmatist,
for like reasons, on the necessity (XII.8, footnote).
Skeptics and dogmatists, atheists and theists, these are different names
for the same view!
The inescapable interpretive question of “who speaks for Hume” in the
Dialogues arises from the instabilities of this naïve interpretation, and those
instabilities lead to the most common answer: that it is Philo, not Cleanthes,
who mostly or entirely represents Hume’s position on what reason can know
about God. Philo’s answer is: not very much, and even what we “know” is
not the result of reasoning so much as of inescapable impressions.
2.3 The second interpretation
By exploring the instabilities of the naïve interpretation, we have thus come
to a more advanced interpretation, according to which the Dialogues still
constitute a philosophical examination of rational basis for belief in God,
but this time they are a thinly disguised skeptic’s attack on natural theolo-
gy. This reading has the advantage of bringing the Dialogues closer to what
we would expect from Hume – it is skeptical about knowledge of causality,
uses the a priori and a posteriori distinction to undermine any possibility of
gaining necessary knowledge about the world, and it treats beliefs about
God as a matter of impressions rather than intellectual apprehension. This
is the Hume that may be an “atheist” but resists even that title as implying
the same kind of dogmatism that he rejects in Christian or other theist forms.
On this reading, Hume has staged an argument about natural theology and
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Philo is the victor, successfully persuading Cleanthes (without Cleanthes or
his student Pamphilus even realizing it!) that the skeptical position is the
only tenable one. Philo’s slipperiness isn’t inconsistency so much as rhetor-
ical mastery, pacing his interlocutors, playing them off each other, even (in
the political terminology of today) “trolling” them. This makes sense as the
safest way for Hume to be both persuasive and dangerously subversive,
thoroughly undermining natural theology, while preserving some plausible
deniability through appearing to offer it modest support.
2.4 The instability of the second interpretation
But this also is an unstable interpretation. For skepticism to emerge victo-
rious in the realm of natural theology, Hume needs it to appear as if the dif-
ferent characters make a variety of worthy arguments, representing the di-
versity of available views about knowledge of God. And yet the three main
characters are remarkably similar philosophically. They are each some kind
of empiricist. They all accept a simplistic distinction between a priori and
a posteriori reasoning. The differences between the supposed non-skeptics,
Demea and Cleanthes, are characterized in ways that only an empiricist
skeptic should accept: Demea, supposedly the dogmatist and rationalist,
emphasizes the uncertainty of every science (I.2); and Cleanthes, suppos-
edly confident in his a posteriori reasoning, clearly frames his argument in
terms of weak analogical reasoning (II.5), describes reason as a species of
experience (II.25), and treats convincing arguments not as rational proofs
or demonstrations but as articulations of strong feelings or forceful impres-
sions (III.7).
If the general philosophical dispositions of the characters are not repre-
sentative of actual philosophical diversity, even more glaring is that the par-
ticular arguments they advance are not recognizable as representative of the
philosophical tradition of natural theology Hume is supposedly attacking.
While superficially familiar, the two main arguments that Hume contrives,
one from Cleanthes and one from Demea, are upon closer inspection very
unlike any that were defended in the longer Christian tradition of natural
theology6. This is deeply problematic for this second interpretation of the 
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Dialogues, according to which rigorous thinkers can detect the subversive-
ly skeptical, esoteric message, while more naïve thinkers can’t penetrate the
protective exoteric layer of unthreatening conventionality. The subversive-
ly skeptical esoteric analysis, whereby natural theology is supposedly de-
feated, just doesn’t stand up to philosophical criticism.
Let us take Cleanthes’ argument first. It begins conventionally enough,
by inviting us to notice features of the natural world, suggesting organiza-
tion or design: «Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every
part of it: you will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided
into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivi-
sions to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and
explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are
adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all
men who have ever contemplated them». Perhaps we might think the prem-
ise is too strong – all we need to notice is some regularity or intention in
nature, not a perfect, machine-like hierarchy in all the universe. But then
Cleanthes says this: «The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all
nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of hu-
man contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence».
What does it mean to say something exactly resembles, but is different in de-
gree? This sounds like Hume planting an inconsistency right in the heart
of the argument. Further: why is Cleanthes here insisting on the connection
to human intelligence, instead of starting with a more general notion that
intention implies action for an end? We see the significance as he contin-
ues: «Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer,
by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Au-
thor of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of
much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he
has executed». So the claim is not that order in nature directly points to a
designer, but that the analogy between nature and a machine points to an
analogy between the cause of nature and human intelligence. The empha-
sis must be on experience, and we know that Hume (and Cleanthes) do not
believe that knowledge of causality is possible, but is only inferred by the
assumption of analogy – between like things, between past and future.
Thus, Cleanthes claims – but we know Hume cannot possibly believe –
that, «By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we
prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind
and intelligence» (II.5).
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Compare this to, say, Aquinas’s fifth way. There, a key premise is that
«whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be di-
rected by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the ar-
row is shot to its mark by the archer» (ST I.2.3 corp.). Is Aquinas here mak-
ing an analogy between an arrow and the world, on the basis of which he in-
fers an analogy between the archer and God? No, he is invoking a princi-
ple – that intelligence is the power to order and direct things to an end –
and then illustrating it with an example – the archer and the arrow. (At
II.14, Philo explicitly denies that this principle can be known with certain-
ty, only probabilistically inferred from experience; Cleanthes concurs at
II.15-16.) Does Aquinas have to say of the intelligent being that is the
cause of the universe that it somewhat resembles, though is vastly different
from, human intelligence? No, he can simply insist that the world is gov-
erned by intelligence. Would Aquinas allow that the intelligence of God is
analogous to human intelligence? Certainly, but Hume is not merely claim-
ing an analogy between God and human intelligence7, he is describing the
reasoning to God as an inference based on analogical comparison – a weak
inference, but the only one available if one denies the possibility of know-
ing a general principle about causality and intelligence.
It is not as if Hume is unaware of the violence he has done to the tradi-
tional structure of a design argument. A stronger, non-Humean notion of
causality would draw on the Aristotelian idea of agency in terms of formal
and final causality, but Hume has Philo criticize these Aristotelian notions
explicitly: «It was usual with the Peripatetics, you know, Cleanthes, when
the cause of any phenomenon was demanded, to have recourse to their fac-
ulties or occult qualities, and to say, for instance, that bread nourished by
its nutritive faculty, and senna purged by its purgative». This isn’t an argu-
ment so much as mockery; of course it is in a venerable line of mockery
(which we can trace through Rabelais, Luther, Calvin, Bacon, Galileo,
Hobbes, Molière and others), but it is mockery, not argument – and it is dif-
ficult to imagine that Hume did not recognize that what he was mocking was
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the idea of causality central to the most robust and long-lasting tradition of
natural theology8.
The lack of any traditional conception of causality is all the more appar-
ent in the long consideration of “alternative cosmogonies” that extends the
critique of Cleanthes’ design argument (Parts V-VIII). Reaching a kind of
crescendo of absurdity, Philo argues that the analogy between the world and
a machine is not as strong as the analogy between the world and an animal,
in which case it could just be birthed by an unintelligent cause rather than
designed by an intelligent God. «Why an orderly system may not be spun
from the belly as well as from the brain, it will be difficult for [Cleanthes] to
give a satisfactory reason» (VII.17). Philo even tries to attribute this view to
Plato (VII.16). An intelligent reader cannot fail to notice that this is far from
a Platonic notion, and that the belly hypothesis is itself far from a “satisfac-
tory reason” for the existence of the universe. Philo has not proposed an ori-
gin of the universe, only pushed back the question of its causal origin, like
someone explaining life on earth by positing life elsewhere in the universe.
So Cleanthes’ design argument is peculiar, and the critiques of it are
weak; and both the argument and the critiques expose the lack of serious
consideration of causality. But Demea’s argument (at IX.3) is even more pe-
culiar, and the argument and the responses to it further expose a lack of se-
rious consideration of traditional arguments about God’s existence. Crucial-
ly framed as an a priori argument (so that it can be more certain than Clean-
thes’ a posteriori argument), Demea claims it is “the common one”. He sets
it up first as a choice between a first cause and an infinite chain of causes: 
Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence; it being
absolutely impossible for any thing to produce itself, or be the cause of
its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we
must either go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate
cause at all; or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that
is necessarily existent.
After almost two-hundred words arguing against the possibility of an in-
finite succession, Demea concludes:
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We must, therefore, have recourse to a necessarily existent Being, who
carries the REASON of his existence in himself, and who cannot be
supposed not to exist, without an express contradiction. There is, con-
sequently, such a Being; that is, there is a Deity.
Much commentary on Demea’s argument focuses on his reasoning against
an infinite succession, which I have omitted here. Philo and Cleanthes make
short work of Demea’s argument, in large part by attacking that reasoning
(imagining the possibility of an infinite succession of causes, or that the uni-
verse itself contains its own intrinsic «reason for existence»). I want to focus
on the structure of the argument itself. It has the form of a fairly standard ar-
gument for a first cause: most things can’t account for their own existence,
we can’t posit an infinite chain of contingent beings, so there must be a first,
necessary being which accounts for the existence of everything else. As a re-
sult, many commentators treat Demea’s argument as a standard “cosmolog-
ical” argument, comparable perhaps to Aquinas’s second way (proof of a first
efficient cause) or third way (proof of a being existing by necessity).
But if we treat this as a cosmological argument, we find strange elements
to Demea’s phrasing: it is not enough to refer to «the ultimate cause» which
exists, Demea must say further of it that it «is necessarily existent». Demea
speaks of a «reason or cause» as if these are interchangeable terms. And of
course the description of what this argument proves: «a necessarily existent
Being, who carries the REASON of his existence in himself, and who cannot
be supposed not to exist, without an express contradiction». All of these fea-
tures remind us that Hume is not only hybridizing the second and third
ways, he is also hybridizing a posteriori and a priori reasoning9. Demea is
not intending to make a classical cosmological argument, despite the mis-
leading language of reasoning from effects to causes; he is trying to make an
a priori argument, whose force rests on relations of ideas alone: he wants to
show that we must believe in a necessarily existent being because it would
be a contradiction of reason (not of observable phenomena) to suppose that
God doesn’t exist. What Demea intends is less a cosmological argument
than what we now call an “ontological” argument (such as is often attributed
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to Anselm), or an explication of the self-evidence of God’s existence (which
is treated as something other than an argument for God’s existence by
Aquinas, in ST I.2.1)10.
Hume probably knew his Demea was hybridizing arguments11. Perhaps
he thought that by combining elements of different arguments, he made his
skeptical attacks more comprehensive. More likely, I think, is that Hume
knew that his non-standard argument was weaker, and easier to attack, than
actual arguments from the tradition of natural theology. To an uninformed
reader, it might appear that natural theology has been defeated, but if, as I
suppose, Hume knew he wasn’t actually representing traditional arguments
of natural theology, while claiming to do so, it is difficult to interpret the Di-
alogues as intended to convince its readers – especially its more intellectu-
al, philosophically sophisticated readers – that reason cannot discover
truths about God. It is too easy to detect the failures of Philo and Cleanthes.
After reading Cleanthes’ and Demea’s arguments, it becomes clear to any
informed reader of the Dialogues – indeed, to any undergraduate who has
been competently led through one or more of the five ways – that there is
nothing approaching an Aristotelian or Thomistic voice in Hume’s Dia-
logues. There is no serious consideration of Aristotle’s argument for a first
mover in Physics, or for pure actuality in the Metaphysics; there is no con-
sideration of Plato’s argument for an absolute exemplar of being or good-
ness; there is no consideration of an Augustinian argument from con-
science. What appear, superficially, to correspond to two or three of
Aquinas’s five ways, turn out to do so in such highly adulterated and weak-
ened form as to be different types of argument. If Hume meant his Dia-
logues as a skeptical overthrow of the tradition of natural theology, he used
glaringly inadequate strawmen to do so.
We have seen that Hume isn’t exactly ignorant of what he so systemati-
cally excluded. He knew – even if he did not understand what this meant
– that Aristotelian efficient causality was essentially connected to formal
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and final causality. He has Demea refer to the Platonists, and Plotinus by
name. There are other references to ancient philosophy and Church Fa-
thers, and Cleanthes offers a strangely inadequate history of the develop-
ment of Christian attitudes towards reason (I.17)12. That Hume systemati-
cally excluded some voices, and that the voices that remain are somewhat
ridiculous caricatures, whose apparent diversity hides a common empiri-
cist epistemology, must have been something Hume knew his more percep-
tive readers would discern.
2.5 Toward a third interpretation
Where does this leave a careful, conscientious reader of the Dialogues? If
Hume’s “attacks” on natural theology are so obviously feeble, what were
his intentions? This is related to a deeper question about Hume’s critiques
of religious belief. Other interpreters have noticed that Hume’s criticism of
religious belief leaves room for, or even indirectly supports, Christian faith.
Charles De Koninck, for instance, believed that a close reading of David
Hume’s critique of miracles could help people appreciate the mystery of the
Eucharist13. Noting that the second part of Hume’s Enquiry (section 10) «is
directed against the Catholic faith»14, De Koninck found it peculiar that
Hume’s attack on miracles should focus on the Catholic doctrine of the 
real presence. While some miracles are indeed appealed to as “evidence”
for the faith, De Koninck finds Hume making a mistake by treating the Eu-
charist as a miracle by which the truth of Christian faith is proved. Hume
mistakenly thinks it could count as a criticism of Eucharistic doctrine – as
opposed to one of its defining features – that belief in real presence is con-
trary to the evidence of the senses. Supposedly trying to show that faith is
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12 Hume may have been at least passingly familiar with some epistemological views of
Aquinas, even if he did not understand them. J.K. RYAN, Aquinas and Hume on the Laws
of Association, “The New Scholasticism” XII (1938), 4, 366-377, takes up a suggestion
from Coleridge that Hume was influenced by passages in Aquinas’s commentary on Aris-
totle’s De Memoria et Reminiscentia, and finds it plausible that Hume’s account of asso-
ciation drew on that work.
13 C. DE KONINCK, This Is a Hard Saying, in R. MCINERNY (ed. and transl.), The Writ-
ings of Charles De Koninck, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN 2009, vol.
2, 393-398. Originally published as Cette parole est dure, “Revue Dominicaine” L (1945),
1, 65-73.
14 Ibid, 395.
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unreasonable because unfounded on sense experience, Hume «chose the
instance where the divine truth is most obviously beyond the knowledge of
reason founded on the senses».
De Koninck was not sure whether Hume’s mistake is “by ignorance or
design”. «Notice the shrewdness, conscious or unconscious, of Hume’s pro-
cedure»15. Given the obviousness of this mistake, De Koninck cannot rule
out that Hume’s attack on the Eucharist is an intentional confusion, in
which Hume might have himself been aware of – but hoping to distract from
– how weak was the assumption of a connection between knowledge and
sensation. Hume’s skepticism, powerful as it was, was unable actually to
undermine Christian faith, and it is not difficult to imagine that Hume was
perfectly aware of this.
Frederick Crosson also found weakness in Hume’s philosophical attacks
on Christian faith16. Reviewing the argument of the Dialogues (and parallel
arguments in the Natural History of Religion), Crosson found Hume argu-
ing for a suspension of judgment, with Philo, speaking for Hume, showing
great rhetorical adaptability but philosophical consistency in defending ag-
nosticism. Philo (and through him Hume) wants to argue that Religion is
unnatural both as a natural desire or inclination, and also as contrary to rea-
son17. Like De Koninck, Crosson finds Hume being very intentional about
what he excludes, not only about what he includes: even if Hume could
bring an end to confidence in philosophy’s ability to prove the existence of
God, his critique of religious belief actually leaves untouched the theolog-
ical virtue of faith18.
This idea that Hume’s philosophical attacks on knowledge of God still
leave room for Christian faith allows to stand the longtime consensus that
Hume had some success in arguing against traditional natural theology. But
what I’ve been trying to show is that Hume did not have success in arguing
against traditional natural theology – indeed, that he assiduously avoided
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15 Ibid. 396.
16 F. CROSSON, Hume’s Unnatural Religion (Some Humean Footnotes), in ID. (ed.), Ten
Philosophical Essays in the Christian Tradition, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre
Dame, IN 2015, 160-77. Originally in J.C. MCCARTHY (ed.), Modern Enlightenment and
the Rule of Reason, (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 32), Catholic
University of America Press, Washington, DC 1998, 168-86.
17 Ibid., 174.
18 Ibid., 175-177.
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taking on traditional natural theology – in which case Hume’s attack on nat-
ural religion doesn’t only leave room for faith, it also leaves room for rea-
son. Hume’s supposed attack on natural theology leaves actual natural the-
ology, as historically practiced, perfectly intact. It is implausible to think
that Hume even believed he undermined natural theology; his “attack” on
it is at best rhetorically brilliant sleight-of-hand, perhaps enough to wear
one down lesser minds, but hardly rising to an actual engagement with the
tradition of natural theological argument.
2.6 A (Comic) Thomist Interpretation?
Thus, if we read Hume as attempting to weigh in on natural theology, it is
not outrageous to posit what would sound like a Straussian-Thomist inter-
pretation according to which, what Hume actually does is ironically high-
light and implicitly defend traditional natural theology by its systematic ab-
sence from the Dialogues.
If this sounds far-fetched, it is essentially the interpretation Gene Fendt
gave in analyzing the difficult Part IX in which Demea offers his suppos-
edly a priori argument for the existence of God19. With some playfulness of
his own, Fendt finds the presentation and critique of Demea’s argument a
“comedy”, in which “the traditional arguments (of Aristotle or Aquinas)
seem sawn and joined about as strangely by the characters of part nine as
Peter Quince and his crew’s carpentering of the traditional tale of Pyramus
and Thisbe” (in Shakespeare’s Midsummer Night’s Dream). Fendt draws
out the analogy: a Thomistic argument from effects to causes is the tradi-
tional Pyramus. Thisbe would be an a priori argument for the self-evident
existence of God. So Demea wears the cloak of Thisbe (claiming to give an
a priori argument) while actually being a more traditional Pyramus (rely-
ing on more traditional Thomistic reasoning about a chain of cause and ef-
fect). Cleanthes is a modern Pyramus, that is, a simplified, and vulgarized,
version of the Thomistic position – who does grasp the cloak of Thisbe
(Aquinas’s view that the existence of something can’t be proven a priori)
while missing the traditional Thomistic reasoning from effects to causes.
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19 G. FENDT, Number, Form, Content: Hume’s Dialogues, Number Nine, “Philosophy”
LXXXIV (2009), 393-412. In the body of the paper (397), Fendt playfully proposes an al-
ternative, more descriptive title: «“A (Would-be) Thomist Reads (the Argument of!) a Fideist
in the Book of a (Probable?) Skeptic: The Comedy of Part Nine of Hume’s Dialogues”».
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The threatening Lion (who bloodies the cloak of Thisbe, thus leading Pyra-
mus to think Thisbe has been killed) would be the skeptic Philo – but al-
so (following the Shakespeare analogy) is Cleanthes, the modern Pyramus,
in another costume, whose own skeptical arguments against the need for
causes would also be suicide for his own a posteriori arguments20! Fendt
concludes,
We can see that section nine [of the Dialogues], to this point, has a cer-
tain comic adequatio to the traditional Thomist ideas about the proofs;
Demea speaks of the glories of the a priori argument, which never ap-
pears to us here – exactly as Aquinas said it could not; Cleanthes at-
tacks the idea of the a priori argument exactly as Aquinas attacked it,
which attack touches Demea’s actual argument at no certain point.
Most importantly, Fendt finds, «Cleanthes then destroys his own earlier
anthropomorphic arguments» by failing to notice the distinction between
eternally existing and necessarily existing. Hume (the “deus absconditus”)
could have known, by logic or historical literacy or both, that it is possible
to imagine an eternal but contingent world (such as Aristotle believed in,
and Aquinas thought philosophical plausible), and in fact Hume did know
that – since his Demea articulates precisely that distinction!
In other words, Hume points to the Thomistic distinction between the ne-
cessity in something that actually exists and the cause of its actual existence
– not only through the character of Demea, but also through the weak re-
sponses of Cleanthes (supposedly believing that there is no need to posit a
cause of necessity if the world is eternal) and of Philo (suggesting that the
world contains an intrinsic necessity akin to mathematical patterns). Thus,
Fendt finds, Hume has in fact made evident the need for a cause for actu-
ality, a preeminent Thomistic piece of natural theology, although, «Like
Shakespeare, Hume has reached this sublime result in an utterly ridiculous
manner»21.
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20 This is my very short summary of an analysis that Fendt develops carefully and clev-
erly in ibid., 401-405.
21 Ibid., 409. Separately, Fendt also offers a “comic” interpretation of Philo’s arguments
about evil in Part XI, finding there an indirect exhibition of “divine wit”, in G. FENDT, Em-
piricism or Dialectical Destruction Thereof? Reading Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natu-
ral Religion on Evil, “International Philosophical Quarterly” (forthcoming).
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One could easily extend this (Straussian? ironic? comic?) interpretation
of Part IX to Cleanthes’ so-called design argument in Parts II-VIII, in
which, as we have already seen, the actual Thomistic fifth way is systemat-
ically excluded, and the objections to design and the alternative cosmogo-
nies only highlight the absence of an Aristotelian notion of causality. On
this interpretation, Hume’s Dialogues, far from undermining natural theol-
ogy, only reduces empiricist natural theology to absurdity but clearly points
the way back to a more traditional Aristotelian natural theology. As Fendt is
aware, it is impossible to know if Hume intended this. But it is hard to be-
lieve that he did not at least have an inkling of it. In any case, if we insist
on interpreting the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion as a work of or
about natural theology, and if we are reluctant to embrace Hume as a secret
Thomist, then the work has to be judged an utter failure – either sloppily
and superficially attempting to critique natural theology, or, if expertly
crafted, then misleadingly ignoring and causing confusion about what is so
obviously missing, namely traditional natural theology.
3. A stable interpretation, by analogy with the Summa
We have advanced through three interpretations of the Dialogues, progres-
sively more sophisticated but not necessarily more satisfying: the naïve (in
which it advances a chastened natural theology), the skeptical (in which it
undermines all natural theology), and the comic-Thomist (in which, inten-
tionally or not, its absurdities point to the need for a classical natural the-
ology). What all of these interpretations have in common is that they treat
the Dialogues as a work of or about natural theology. And so the way is clear
for us to consider a fourth interpretation, according to which the Dialogues
are really about something other than natural theology. This last interpreta-
tion can not only help make the most sense of Hume’s Dialogues, but it
should also come naturally to Thomists, who have their own experience with
the misreading of challenging texts.
Let us recall some features of Hume’s work that make it so difficult to
read. It seems undoubtedly brilliant and carefully crafted. Given the cir-
cumstances of its writing and publishing, we expect to find in it the defini-
tive form of its author’s views on important matters. Yet the text is difficult
to master, not least because of an uncommon, overtly dialectical structure
which resists the more straightforward hermeneutic one could bring to a
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proper treatise. Still, despite these challenges – and even perhaps con-
tributing to them – in recent generations freshman undergraduates have
been subjected to decontextualized selections, especially arguments about
the existence of God, treated always in an introductory philosophy class, not
a theology class.
This description of the Dialogues could apply as well to Aquinas’s Summa
Theologiae. And with that in mind, let us press the comparison further: al-
though each text makes use of philosophical arguments, they are not prima-
rily works of philosophy. And despite titles that imply theological motivation,
it would be reasonable to describe the authors’ intent more properly in terms
of moral pedagogy, with the relationship between philosophy and theology
serving a practical purpose for a particular historically situated community –
a purpose that it may have actually failed to achieve even for its intended
readership and is rarely appreciated by readers in the modern university.
Regarding the Summa Theologiae, these last points have been made
forcefully by Mark Jordan, whose emphasis on the moral pedagogy of the
Summa, and the role of natural theology in that moral pedagogy, helps to
make sense of misreadings not only by modern academic philosophers but
also by various “Thomisms” in the neo-scholastic movement and even
within the late medieval Dominican order22. According to Jordan, it is a
mistake to treat Aquinas’s philosophical or natural theological arguments
outside of the context of «the Summa’s own project of curricular and com-
munity reform»23.
The Summa was written to correct and rebuild certain sorts of commu-
nity – to correct a community that segregated moral instruction as
merely practical, to rebuild it as a community in which moral instruc-
tion was central to the whole of theology. An integral reading of the
Summa cannot be divorced from the making of community24.
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22 M.D. JORDAN, The Summa’s Reform of Moral Teaching – and Its Failures, in F. KERR
(ed.), Contemplating Aquinas: On the Varieties of Interpretation, SCM Press – University
of Notre Dame Press, London – Notre Dame, IN 2003 – 2006, 39-54. See also M.D. JOR-
DAN, Rewritten Theology: Aquinas and His Readers, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford 2006,
especially chapters 1 (“St Thomas and the Police”), 6 (“The Summa of Theology as Moral
Formation”) and Conclusion (“Writing Theology after Thomas – and His Readers”).
23 ID, The Summa’s Reform of Moral Teaching, 42.
24 Ibid., 52.
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It is remarkable how much this sounds like one strain of interpretation of 
Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, suggested both by external
considerations and by the text’s internal logic25. According to this interpre-
tation, Hume’s primary concern is to address the notion of natural religion
or piety; theological argument (like revealed religion) is considered only in
relation to that primary concern. In other words, the intellectual exercise of
theological reasoning is secondary to the evaluation of the nature and prac-
tical worth (personally and socially) of religion as a disposition26. Thus, in
William Lad Session’s compelling, holistic reading of the Dialogues, we can
retain an appreciation for Hume’s artful design and irony, while finding con-
sistent attention to “true religion” and “natural piety” in every part of the
Dialogues. Indeed, what seems to unify the conversation, more than any-
thing else, is disagreement over how best to inspire piety – a quality which
is always taken for granted as a virtue and a goal of education27.
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25 With a view to external considerations, see T. PENELHUM, Hume’s Views on Religion:
Intellectual and Cultural Influences, in E.S. RADCLIFFE (ed.), A Companion to Hume, Wi-
ley-Blackwell, Chichester 2011, 323-337. For an intentionally internal focus, see W.L.
SESSIONS, Reading Hume’s Dialogues: A Veneration for True Religion, Indiana University
Press Bloomington, IN 2002. See also T. BLACK – R. GRESSIS, True Religion in Hume’s Di-
alogues Concerning Natural Religion, “British Journal for the History of Philosophy”
XXV (2017), 2, 244-246. For a general study of Hume’s understanding of “religion” and
his indebtedness to a practical, and Ciceronian, perspective, see A.C. WILLIS, Toward a
Humean True Religion: Genuine Theism, Moderate Hope, and Practical Morality, Penn
State University Press, University Park, PA 2015.
26 Dennis C. Rasmussen has noted that the main elements and arguments of the Dia-
logues can be found elsewhere, which makes Hume’s friends’ hesitation to publish it all
the more interesting, yet: «What is new in the Dialogues is the combination of all these is-
sues into a single devastating – and entertaining – package», one aimed particularly at
“the pious reader”, D.C. RASMUSSEN, The Infidel and the Professor: David Hume, Adam
Smith and the Friendship That Shaped Modern Thought, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ 2017, 188.
27 This “moral” reading is thus compatible with explicitly “political” readings of
Hume’s Dialogues. J.W. DANFORD, ‘The Surest Foundation of Morality’: The Political
Teaching of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, “The Western Political Quar-
terly XXXV (1982), 2, 137-60, argues that Hume’s political agenda in the Dialogues is to
re-establish rhetoric (or “pre-scientific” philosophy) as the basis for civilized social life.
S. CLARK, No Abiding City: Hume, Naturalism, and Toleration, “Philosophy: The Journal
of the British Institute of Philosophical Studies” LXXXIV (2009), 75-94, interprets
Hume’s Dialogues as a “political drama” offering a naturalistic defense of tolerance. For
a focus on the role of Pamphilus, the question of the education of youth, and the political
implications thereof, see J.H. KRAUSE, The Political Lessons of Hume’s Dialogues Concern-
ing Natural Religion, “Hume Studies” XLII (2016), 1-2, 187-211.
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To gain a sense of how this insight restores the Dialogues to some sort of 
coherent (not to say successful) whole, consider how it illuminates the main
sections not pre-occupied with arguments of natural theology, parts less
commonly treated by philosophers:
• The opening letter – especially its focus on two great moral goods,
“study and society” (which we might take as loose translations of two
great Aristotelian goods, contemplation and friendship).
• The discussion of Part I which launches the dialogues, about how and
when to teach children about religion.
• The long discussion of evil (Parts X-XI), which is only incidentally
framed as the theological objection of the problem of evil (at the end of
Part X), and has more resemblance to the tradition of reflection on “the
misery of the human condition”, a moral meditation on what we should
learn from evil about human nature, our place in the universe, and the
role of religion in human life28.
• The famous “reversal” of Part XII, where the actual beliefs about God
and even what we call them seem to be made secondary to the cultiva-
tion of a certain attitude or disposition toward God and other men.
• Finally, the narrator of the whole Dialogues, Pamphilus. What we pri-
marily know about him – his quasi-sonship to Cleanthes – seems de-
signed to emphasize an attitude of filial piety.
4. Hume vs. Aquinas on piety and religion
If we turn to the Dialogues for a lesson about piety or “true religion”, what
do we find? Hume (and his characters) take it for granted that piety is a
virtue, but on empiricist principles must describe it as a feeling or disposi-
tion of reverence, rooted in a sense of dependence or contingency; it is re-
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28 On this tradition see for instance LOTHARIO DEI SEGNI (POPE INNOCENT III), On the
Misery of the Human Condition (De miseria humane conditionis), trans. M.M. DIETZ, ed.
D.R. HOWARD, The Library of the Liberal Arts – Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, IN
– New York, NY 1969. The editor’s introduction describes the influence of this book and
its genre (de contemptu mundi), including in Renaissance and modern England (esp. pp.
xiv-xv, xxxi-xxxiii). The clever interpretation of Part XI of the Dialogues in FENDT, Empiri-
cism or Dialectical Destruction Thereof?, reveals a significant and appropriate dialectical
performance behind Hume’s overt philosophical argument: «we can understand Hume,
then, as writing these Dialogues not to prove any empirical truth about God or the good-
ness of the world, but in the joyful exercise of an Aristotelian energeia and virtue: wit», 9.
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lated to reason only insofar as reason is chastened not to claim more than 
it should, and piety is increased and supported neither by dogmatic, re-
vealed religion, nor by rational demonstrations of natural theology. Piety is
a manifestation of true or natural religion, conceived as no more than a mo-
tive to live virtuously, rooted in a natural motive of justice – itself, appar-
ently, not at all supported by metaphysical speculation and rational demon-
stration, much less by revealed dogma29. Here is Cleanthes, in Part XII,
summarizing a view that makes it possible for him and Philo to appear to
have common ground for the resolution of the Dialogues:
The proper office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanize
their conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order, and obedience;
and as its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of morality
and justice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with
these other motives. When it distinguishes itself, and acts as a separate
principle over men, it has departed from its proper sphere, and has be-
come only a cover to faction and ambition (XII.12).
We have reason to think that here, at least, Philo would agree (and that
Hume would as well30) that “true religion” is a psychological force that is
useful as an inspiration for morality. The skeptical arguments of the bulk of
the Dialogues are then not meant to make positive claims in or about natu-
ral theology, so much as to warn against the dangers of relying on natural
theology and habituate the mind to a docile or chastened disposition. In this
sense, Hume’s Dialogues emerges even more clearly as an homage to Ci-
cero’s De Natura Deorum, which places piety in the context of right knowl-
edge of the gods – but in a way that limits theological knowledge and prag-
matically subordinates it to ethics31.
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29 Cf. SESSIONS, Reading Hume’s Dialogues, 216-225.
30 The passage seems to be adapted from a very similar one that Hume included in a
draft introduction to Volume II of his History of England: «The proper Office of Religion
is to reform Men’s Lives, to purify their Hearts, to inforce all moral Duties, & to secure
Obedience to the Laws and civil Magistrate. While it pursues these useful purposes, its
Operations, tho’ infinitely valuable, are secret & silent; […] That principle is always the
more pure & genuine, the less figure it makes in those Annals of Wars, & Politics, In-
trigues, & Revolutions, Quarrels & Convulsions, which it is the Business of an Historian
to record & transmit to Posterity», see p. 333 of J. IMMERWAHR, Hume’s Atheistic Theism,
“Hume Studies” XXII (1996), 2, 225-338.
31 For Hume’s debt to Cicero, see WILLIS, Toward a Humean True Religion.
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Here it will be useful to compare Aquinas who, like Hume, pays defer-
ence to Cicero in his reflections on piety and the natural virtue of religion.
Cicero identified religion and piety as the first two of several virtues an-
nexed to justice, and we find Aquinas citing Cicero’s authority as he intro-
duces these two virtues in the middle of the Secunda Secundae (ST II-II,
80.1, obj. 1 and corpus)32.
On the virtue of religion, Aquinas cites Cicero: «religion consists in of-
fering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men call di-
vine» (81.1, sed contra). The body of 81.1 gives three plausible etymologies
for “religio”: to read again (ponder over), to seek again, or to be bound to-
gether. Aquinas concludes that whatever it takes its name from, religion
«denotes properly a relation to God». Specifically, as Cicero indicated, it
means giving due honor to God through worship. Why does God deserve
this honor? «It belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under one
aspect, namely, as the first principle of the creation and government of
things» (81.3, corpus). This virtue is not a properly theological virtue but a
moral one, since it directs man to God as man’s end (81.5, corpus and ad
2); indeed, the virtue of religion is not for God’s sake but for our sake (81.7,
corpus). So the virtue of religion, recognized by Cicero, is described by
Aquinas as a good for man insofar as it is a matter of justice for us to be
rightly ordered to the first and final cause of creation.
In describing the virtue of religion, Aquinas cites Malachi 1:6, «If… I be
a father, where is My honor», in order to characterize God as begetting and
governing father, and therefore as due honor. This suggests a link to the
virtue of piety. Aquinas accepts Cicero’s view that piety is primarily about
right relation to parents and country, but he insists that for that reason it be-
longs by extension to our relationship to God, «as the summit of excellence
and causality» (101.3, ad 2, citing Ps. Dionysius, Div. Nom. 1). So Aquinas
can argue that piety orders us to God, even by Cicero’s definition (101.1,
sed contra, quoting Cicero on piety as duty to kin and country), thus: «Man
becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various
excellence and the various benefits received from them. On both counts
God holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, and is for us the first
principle of being and government» (101.1, corpus).
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question 101 is on piety. These come in the middle of the so-called “Treatise on Prudence
and Justice”, questions 47-122.
UUJ_3_2020_layout  05/02/21  09:52  Pagina 94
So for Aquinas, as for Hume, piety and (the natural virtue of) religion are
moral virtues rooted in awareness of our dependence or contingency, and
are clarified by right knowledge of God. But whereas Hume finds in Cice-
ro the grounds for agnostic pragmatism, Aquinas finds essential connec-
tions to confident theological knowledge. Notice what, within the Thomistic
conceptual framework, Cicero’s definitions of piety and religion suggest.
First, as virtues, they require a conception of human nature and its perfec-
tion; and second, as specifically connected to justice, they require the gen-
eral notion of what is owed, even as debt. Third, as pertaining to our rela-
tionship to God, they require cognition of causality in general – including
efficient and formal (as a father) and final causality (as a governor); and
fourth, in particular they relate us to God as first or ultimate efficient and
final cause of all of creation. We have just listed some of the major elements
of the Summa within which Aquinas’s reflections on piety and religion are
embedded; and at the same time, we have listed things that Hume, as a
skeptical empiricist, could not consistently accept: a teleological concep-
tion of human nature, a moral law rooted in that nature, knowledge of
causality in general, and specifically knowledge of a God as the ultimate
origin and end of our nature. In fact, to the extent that the Dialogues has a
moral pedagogy, it is one that requires Hume, in the name of Ciceronian
piety, to undermine all knowledge of causes, of human nature, and of God.
Given Hume’s critique of knowledge of causes and of the facticity of du-
ty, it is actually quite fascinating that he should have devoted a dialogue to
re-describing the virtues of religion and piety in his own terms: of igno-
rance, of probabilities, of feelings and impressions. At best, he could at-
tempt a subjectivist or phenomenological account of piety and religion; but
without metaphysics, he could not actually explain what these things are.
And if he really meant to instill or advance piety and religion – an open
question to be sure – he could only do so by claiming that they were natu-
ral and universal dispositions, likely to flourish once the distractions of
dogmatism and rationalism, of revealed and natural theology, had been
cleared away. (In this respect Hume’s views of piety and religion represent
an empirical hypothesis which has, it seems, been disproven by subsequent
historical developments)33.
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them, are undermined by the findings of historians and this in a way that suggests that
moral theorizing may be a less innocent activity than it is usually taken to be […]», A.
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5. Conclusion: piety without metaphysics and the failure 
of Hume’s Dialogues
Interpreting the Dialogues as oriented toward a moral pedagogy does not
settle all interpretive questions. One can still argue about precisely what
views and versions of religion and piety Hume wanted to encourage. Was
he trying to undermine Christianity altogether, or accommodate liberal
Protestantism? Is Hume motivated by a compromising optimism or a sub-
versive despair34? Was Hume actually concerned with cultivating piety, or
is even this moral concern only cynically or ironically invoked? If we read
the Dialogues for Hume’s views on religion and piety, these are open ques-
tions, worth pursuing because we can learn from pursuing them; and dis-
agreements about what lessons to draw from this interpretation may not be
resolvable, but they do not render this interpretation unstable.
Still, keeping in mind the comparison with Aquinas’s Summa Theolo-
giae, on this interpretation we have reason to find the Dialogues a failure –
and not only for the reasons that Mark Jordan judges the Summa a failure.
For historically contingent reasons, the Summa’s intended audience failed
to adopt and follow St. Thomas’s moral pedagogy. Hume’s Dialogues may
have failed on this count as well – like the Summa, it seems to have been
misread by communities it’s author did not anticipate, and it would be hard
to claim that the text found and helped form an intended community (al-
though in general, through positivism, fideism, pragmatism, and expres-
sivism, Hume has had a powerful legacy on modern views of religion).
But if the Summa’s moral pedagogy happened to fail, as a sociological
fact, we can still allow that, in principle, it offers a pedagogically com-
pelling case for understanding and practicing moral virtue – at least, one as
compelling as the Christian story that moves the soul to pursue these
virtues: a story of creation, fall, and redemption, under the Providence of a
knowing and loving personal God, who invites us into His life by appealing
to our intellect and will. The Christian story that structures the Summa in-
spires its moral pedagogy. By contrast, it is hard to see what overarching
story Hume can appeal to, or how it could have an appeal except to histor-
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ically contingent prejudices; in comparison with the philosophical ambition
and Christian eschatological scope of the Summa, the Dialogues are no
more than the story of clever empiricist Englishmen engaged in a weekend
conversation35.
One reason Hume’s moral pedagogy has to fail, then, is that no matter
how artfully it is composed, and however much it may have enchanted gen-
erations of scholars, its story is an irrelevant fiction, one which prescinds
from, and systematically denies, natural longings of the human heart and
revealed realities of human nature and human destiny. Even if he hadn’t re-
jected Christianity, Hume’s account of piety would have to fail because he
also rejected philosophy, in the form of a metaphysics capable of sustaining
natural theology and, by extension, ethics. Hume’s “sophistry” – as a prag-
matic application of reason that repudiates metaphysics – both animates
and vitiates the Dialogues.
As we have seen, at the heart of the Summa is a metaphysical account of
religion and piety, which, as natural virtues of justice, are intrinsically
linked to a conception of human nature and of reason’s ability to know God.
Aquinas’s account of piety and religion is thus situated in a conceptual
framework which makes it possible not only to explain why religion and
piety are virtues, but also to account for why so many people, in particular
circumstances, may fail to embody them and even fail to appreciate them
as virtues.
In comparison, it seems that Hume’s Dialogues attempt to convey a con-
ception of piety without metaphysics, a program of moral formation without
knowledge of God. Hume’s Dialogues are not so much a skeptical attack on
arguments for religion, but an attempt to position skepticism as a pious dis-
position about religion. This emerges as the most compelling, and the only
stable, interpretation, superseding the unstable, but more common, inter-
pretations of the Dialogues focusing on the arguments of natural theology. If
we take Hume seriously as repositioning piety within skeptical empiricist
epistemology, we have to note that with his anti-metaphysical conceptual
framework Hume cannot motivate people to seek piety, cannot offer an ac-
count of why piety and religion are in fact virtues, and cannot explain why
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so many people might fail to recognize piety and religion as virtues36. (Nor,
for that matter, can we even be certain that Hume thinks piety and religion
actually are virtues at all!) But we can acknowledge a debt of gratitude to
Hume for the opportunity to reflect on these questions, and to realize we
may have to turn to reason beyond our experience if seek to answer them37.
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PIETY WITHOUT METAPHYSICS
The Moral Pedagogy of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
A close reading of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion reveals that it
is not what it appears. Rather than a work of natural theology, meant to show
something about arguments concerning the existence and nature of God, the
Dialogues turn out to embody a moral pedagogy exemplifying and attempting
to instill a conception of piety and religion as virtues. This paper defends this in-
terpretation by reviewing three alternative, but ultimately inadequate, interpreta-
tions of the text, and then compares Hume’s moral pedagogy with that of
Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae to highlight the ambition, and the limitation,
of Hume’s attempt to characterize piety without metaphysics.
PIETÀ SENZA METAFISICA
La pedagogia morale dei Dialoghi sulla religione naturale di Hume 
Una lettura attenta dei Dialoghi sulla religione naturale di Hume rivela che il te-
sto non è quel che appare. Piuttosto che un’opera di teologia naturale pensata
per dire qualcosa sugli argomenti volti a dimostrare l’esistenza e la natura di
Dio, i Dialoghi presentano in realtà una pedagogia morale che esemplifica e cer-
ca di promuovere una concezione della pietà e della religione come virtù. L’ar-
ticolo difende questa linea interpretativa esaminando tre interpretazioni del te-
sto alternative, ma in ultima analisi inadeguate, e infine mette a confronto la pe-
dagogia morale di Hume con quella della Summa Theologiae dell’Aquinate co-
sì da mettere in luce l’ambizione, ma anche il limite del tentativo di Hume di de-
finire la pietà senza la matafisica.
Parole chiave: David Hume; religione naturale; pietà; Tommaso d’Aquino; Ci-
cerone
ABSTRACT
UUJ_3_2020_layout  05/02/21  09:52  Pagina 99
